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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Over a five-year period. appellant Native Wholesale Supply Company (NWS), a foreign
corporation, sold, imported, and caused to be imported into Idaho over 100 million cigarettes that
were not listed on Idaho's Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers and Brand
Families (Idaho Directory). Accordingly, these cigarette sales violated Idaho's Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement Complementary Act (Complementary Act), because only cigarettes that
are listed on the Idaho Directory may be sold, imported, or caused to be imported into Idaho. All
of NWS' s cigarette sales were at wholesale, yet NWS engaged in these sales without possession
of a cigarette wholesaler pennit and complying with the obligations imposed upon wholesalers
by Idaho's Cigarette and Tobacco Products Taxes Act (Cigarette Tax Act).! And millions of
these illegal sales continued even after the Attorney General wrote NWS requesting that the sales
and shipments cease.
The State of Idaho and the State Tax Commission (Idaho) filed suit concerning these
violations and the District Court ruled in their favor on all grounds. NWS appeals, arguing,
fundamentally, that federal Indian law precludes Idaho from exercising personal or subject
matter jurisdiction over it. NWS makes these arguments despite the fact that it is not a tribe; is

not an Indian; and is not a member of any tribe. NWS sells and ships its tens of millions of
illegal cigarettes to an Idaho-based corporation, which in turn is also not a tribe; is not an Indian;
and is not a member of any tribe. The Indian "connections" in this case that NWS hangs its hat
on are that NWS is owned by an Indian and is located on a reservation in New York, and the
Idaho corporation that receives NWS's illegal cigarettes is owned by Indians of a different tribe

The Complementary Act is codified at Title 39, Chapter 84 of the Idaho Code. The Cigarette Tax Act
is codified at Title 63, Chapter 25 ofthe Idaho Code.
!

1

and is located in Idaho on a separate reservation.

As will be demonstrated, these Indian

"connections" are of no significance. In short, applicable law does not defeat subject matter
jurisdiction nor preclude Idaho courts from exercising personal jurisdiction in this case. The
District Court ruled correctly on all issues raised by NWS on this appeal.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

On June 5, 2008, the Attorney General wrote NWS, advising it that its sales violated
Idaho's Complementary Act and instructed it to cease any further sales. R. pp. 23-24. When
NWS declined to conform its business practices to Idaho law, Idaho filed suit, alleging violations
ofIdaho's Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts. R. pp. 9-27 2
On September 17, 2008, NWS removed Idaho's complaint to federal court 3

Idaho

promptly moved the federal court to remand the matter back to state court. On April 6, 2009, the
federal court granted Idaho's motion and remanded the case back to Idaho state court. See State
by and through Wasden v. Native Wholesale Supply Company, No. 08-CV-396-S-EIL, 2009 WL
940731 (D. Idaho 2009). In doing so, the federal court ruled that NWS's removal was without
an objectively reasonable basis. [d., at *3-4.
Subsequently in state court, the parties engaged in motion practice and discovery, with
Idaho ultimately filing motions for a preliminary injunction, R. pp. 28-94, and summary
judgment, R. pp. 804-35, both of which the District Court granted. The District Court held that
NWS had violated both Idaho's Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts because of its
unlicensed cigarette sales and its importing and causing to be imported into Idaho these

2 Even after suit was filed, NWS sold and shipped into Idaho 14 million more cigarettes in violation of
the Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts. R. pp. 968-69.
3 NWS's notice of removal, filed September 17, 2008, was added to the record pursuant to this Court's
October 5, 2011 order.

2

cigarettes in contravention of both Acts. R. pp. 792-800 (preliminary injunction order) and R.
pp. 1064-83 (summary judgment order).
NWS asked the District Court to reconsider its decision, R. pp. 1084-88, which was
denied.

R. pp. 1155-60.

Accordingly, after a hearing concerning the imposition of civil

penalties was held, the District Court entered Judgment against NWS, R. pp. 1169-71, which
NWS subsequently appealed. R. pp. 1172-76.
C.

Statement of Facts

NWS is a corporation chartered by the Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma. R. p. 121. As
established below, it is not an Indian; it is neither a tribe nor an instrumentality of a tribe; and it
is not a member of any tribe. NWS sells at wholesale and imports, and causes to be imported
into Idaho, cigarettes, all of which are imported and sold to persons who are not Indians, let
alone members of the tribe where NWS has set up its large cigarette wholesale business. R. pp.
197, 199. Indeed, the recipient ofNWS's cigarette sales, Warpath, Inc., is an Idaho corporation.
R. pp. 456-57.

Accordingly, it, too, is not an Indian.

Further, it is neither a tribe nor an

instrumentality of a tribe; and it is not a member of any tribe. NWS's place of business is
located on a reservation in New York. R. p. 121. Warpath's place of business is located on the
Coeur d' Alene Reservation in Plummer, Idaho. R. pp. 456-57.
NWS's Idaho law violations are straightforward. Since January 2004, NWS has sold,
imported, and caused to be imported into Idaho, at wholesale, over 100 million cigarettes to
Warpath, in violation ofIdaho Code Section 39-8403(3) of the Complementary Act. R. p. 52-54.
This is because not one of the cigarettes that NWS sold is of a cigarette brand listed on the Idaho
Directory, a requirement of Section 39-8403(3). R. p. 52. In addition, NWS has failed to obtain

3

the required cigarette wholesale permit to sell cigarettes at wholesale in Idaho, a requirement of
Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) of the Cigarette Tax Act. R. p. 48.
Despite its argument for the establishment of immunity from state law for "reservationto-reservation" cigarette sales, elaborated more fully below, NWS's cigarettes do not even travel
from "reservation-to-reservation." Rather, NWS operates its business by shipping and storing its
cigarettes at the Las Vegas Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) in Nevada. When Warpath, Inc., wants
NWS's cigarettes, it orders them from NWS, which instructs the FTZ to release the ordered
cigarettes to a trucking company, such as Con-Way Freight, with whom NWS has contracted and
paid to transport the cigarettes from Nevada and deliver them to Warpath in Idaho. R. p. 199.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Idaho requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 39-8407(5) of
the Complementary Act in responding to this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Summary Judgment

In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review on
appeal is the same as the standard employed by a trial court. Doe v, City of Elk River, 144 Idaho
337,338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 (2007). The standard is that summary judgment may be granted
if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . ., the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court exercises free review in determining
whether the prevailing party is entitled to judgment, Andersen v. Profl Escrow Servs" Inc., 141
Idaho 743, 745-46,118 P.3d 75,77-78 (2005), and over questions of jurisdiction. State v. Doe,
147 Idaho 326, 327, 208 P.3d 730, 731 (2009).

4

B.

Motion to Dismiss

With regard to review of a decision denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the same presumptions at the trial court level apply on appeal, namely that all
"evidence introduced must be viewed 'in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and the
plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from facts established by
their case in chief.'" Intermountain Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Bus. Forms Co., 96 Idaho 53S,
540, 531 P.2d IIS3, IIS5 (1975), quoting Blackburn v. Boise Sch. Bus. Co., 95 Idaho 323, 325,
50S P.2d 553, 555 (1973); accord Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74, S03
P.2d 978, 9S0 (1990).

II.

THE LEGISLATURE, IN PROTECTING THE STATE'S PUBLIC HEALTH AND
FISCAL SOUNDNESS, HAS ENACTED SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATION
REGULATING TOBACCO SALES
In 1999, the Legislature found that smoking presents serious public health concerns to

Idaho and its citizens. See Idaho Code § 39-7S01(a). Noting that the Surgeon General also
determined that smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, and other serious diseases, the
Legislature found that smoking poses serious financial concerns for Idaho. Under certain healthcare programs like Medicaid, Idaho may have a legal obligation to provide medical assistance to
eligible persons for health conditions associated with smoking, and those persons may have a
legal entitlement to receive such assistance. See Idaho Code § 39-7S01(a) - (b). While providing
the programs' services, the Legislature found that the State pays millions of dollars each year to
provide medical assistance to persons for health conditions associated with smoking. See Idaho
Code § 39-7801(c). The Legislature fUliher determined that the financial burdens imposed on
the State by smoking should be borne by tobacco companies, rather than by the State, to the

5

extent that such companies either determine to enter into settlement agreements with the State or
are found culpable by the courts. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(d).
In November 1998, leading United States tobacco companies entered into a settlement
4

agreement, entitled the "Master Settlement Agreement," (MSA) with Idaho. The MSA has been
described by the United States Supreme Court as a "landmark" public health agreement,
Lorillard Tobacco Corp. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001), that addresses "one of the most
troubling public health problems facing the Nation today." Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,125 (2000).
The MSA is fundamentally a public health agreement. Section III of the MSA addresses
the public health by placing significant restrictions on the advertising and marketing of tobacco
products by those companies signing the MSA (called "participating manufacturers").

The

restrictions include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

prohibiting the targeting of tobacco product advertising or marketing to children;
banning the use of cartoons to advertise tobacco products;
limiting tobacco brand name sponsorships;
prohibiting payments for the use of tobacco products in the media;
prohibiting tobacco brand name merchandise;
prohibiting the distribution offree tobacco products to children;
prohibiting the distribution of tobacco coupons or other credits to children;
restricting the licensing of tobacco brand names to third parties; and
prohibiting material misrepresentations regarding the health consequences of smoking.
The MSA has had a substantial impact on cigarette consumption in the United States,

which has declined by more than 37 percent since the MSA was executed in 1998 and 2010, the

4 The MSA is a lengthy public document. It was reviewed and approved by the district court in State v.
Philip Morris et ai., Case No. CV OC 9703239D, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County (December 3,
1998) (Eismann, D.J.) See Consent Decree and Final Judgment, Sec. VILA. The Attorney General has
made the MSA electronically available at: http://www2.state.id.us/ag/consumeritobacco/MSA.pdf. The
Court may take judicial notice ofthe MSA. I.R.E. 201.

6

most recent year for which data are publically available. 5 According to the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), with respect to youth smoking, the news is equally good, namely, that youth
smoking rates have dramatically declined since the MSA was signed by the parties. 6
Idaho has observed a similar reduction in cigarette usage: In 1998, the smoking rate in
Idaho was 20.3 percent. In 2010, the rate was 15.7 percent, a 23 percent reduction 7 Idaho has
also observed a similar reduction in youth cigarette usage: In 1993, the youth smoking rate in
Idaho was 27.3 percent. In 2009, the rate was 14.5 percent, a 47 percent reduction. 8 The MSA
has had a significant impact on these reduced smoking rates.
In addition to its public health provisions, the MSA requires participating manufacturers
(which now number 55) to malce payments to the States every year to offset a portion of the costs
imposed on the States by smoking-related diseases. See MSA, Section IX.

See http://www.ttb.gov/statistics/tob dec98.pdf (total 1998-taxed cigarette sales of 467,020,815,579
sticks) and http://www.ttb.gov/statistics/2010/201012tobacco.pdf (total 2010-taxed cigarette sales of
292,753,880,443 sticks). The Court may take judicial notice of these official government reports. I.R.E.
201; see also Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 340, 775 P.2d 651, 654 (Ct.App. 1989) Uudieial notice
may be taken of official reports of the federal government).
6 Cigarette Use Among High School Students -- United States, 1991-2009, MMWR, July 9,2010, Vol.
59, No. 26, lillp:llwww.cdc.gov/mmwrlpreview/mmwrhtmllmm5926a1.htm (last visited Dec. I, 2011)
and Tobacco Use Among Middle and High School Students -- United States, 2000-2009, MMWR, August
27, 2010, Vol. 59, No. 33, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmllmm5933a2.htm (last visited
June 13,2011) (current cigarette use among high school students has been reduced from 36.4% in 1997 to
17.2% in 2009, a reduction of almost 53%). The Court may take judicial notice of these official
government reports. LR.E. 201; see also Trautman, 116 Idaho at 340,775 P.2d at 654.
7 CDC Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Prevalence and Trends Data for Idaho 2010
http://apps. necd .cdc. govIbrfssldisp lay .asp ?vr=20 I O&state= lD&gkey=4 396& grp=O&SUB MIn =00 (last
visited Dec. 1, 2011); Idaho Behavioral Risk Factors, Results from the 2009 Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, October 2010,
p. 34. The Court may take judicial notice of these official government reports. LR.E. 201; see also
Trautman, 116 Idaho at 340,775 P.2d at 654.
8 2009 Idaho Youth Risk Behavioral Survey, Idaho Department of Education, November 2009, p. 26,
and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Youth Online: High School YRBS, Idaho 1991 - 2009
Results (n.d.), http://apps.nccd.cdc.govlYouthOnline/App/Resuits.aspx?LlD=ID. The Court may take
judicial notice of these official government reports. I.R.E. 201; see also Trautman, 116 Idaho at 340,775
P.2d at 654.
5
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Promptly after the MSA was executed, the Legislature declared that it would be contrary
to the policy of the State if a tobacco manufacturer could decide not to enter into such a
settlement agreement (called "nonparticipating manufacturers") and thereby use the resulting
cost advantage to derive large profits in the years before liability may arise, without ensuring that
the State will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to have acted
culpably. This legislative determination was driven, in part, by the fact that many diseases
caused by tobacco use often do not appear until many years after the affected individual begins
smoking. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(a) & (t).
The Legislature thus determined that it is in the interest of the State to require that
nonparticipating manufacturers establish a reserve fUl1d to guarantee a source of compensation
and to prevent such manufacturers from deriving large, short-term profits and then becoming
judgment-proof before liability may arise. See Idaho Code § 39-7801(t). Accordingly, shortly
after the MSA was signed, the Legislature passed the Idaho Tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement Act (Idaho MSA Act). The Idaho MSA Act requires tobacco companies either (1) to
join the MSA or (2) to place into a qualified escrow fund "per unit sold" the amounts required by
Idaho Code Section 39-7803(b)(I) ofthe Act.
In 2003, the Legislature determined that violations of the Idaho MSA Act by various
nonparticipating manufacturers threatened not only the integrity of the MSA, but also the fiscal
soundness of the State and public health and responded with provisions to help prevent such
violations through adoption of the Complementary Act. See Idaho Code § 39-840l. In State v.
Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 524, 224 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2010), cert. denied 131 S.Ct. ISO, this Court

described the reasons for and purposes ofthe Complementary Act as follows:
[T]he goal of the Complementary Act was to prevent end-rUl1s aroUl1d the fee
requirements of the MSA and the escrow requirement of the [Idaho MSA Act], through
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the sale of cigarettes produced by Non-Participating Manufacturers, who were not paying
fees in accordance with the MSA, and were not making escrow payments in accordance
with the [Idaho MSA Act]. The State was seeking to protect the scheduled fee payments
under the MSA, and ensure that appropriate escrow funds are available to the State when
needed to pay for medical expenses incurred due to tobacco-related health conditions,
thereby protecting the public health.
Relevant to this case, Idaho Code Section 39-8403 of the Complementary Act establishes
the Idaho Directorl and Subsections 39-8403(3)(b) and (c) make it unlawful for any person to
sell, import, or cause to be imported into Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or
brand which the person knows or should know are intended for sale or distribution in Idaho and
which are not included on the Directory.

This case, in part, is the result of NWS selling,

importing, and causing to be imported into Idaho over 100 million cigarettes of brands that were
not on the Idaho Directory during the relevant times of sales.
This case is also about Cigarette Tax Act violations. Specifically, all of the cigarettes at
issue in this case were sold by NWS at wholesale, yet NWS has never held, let alone applied for,
a cigarette wholesale tax permit which is required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) of that Act.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IDAHO IS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
There are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the following findings of the

District Court (R. pp. 1069-70; see also R. pp. 793-94);
(I) NWS has sold, collected money from, and imported and caused to be imported over
one hundred million cigarettes to Warpath, Inc. All of these cigarettes are of cigarette
brands that, at the relevant times, were illegal to be sold in Idaho, pursuant to the
Complementary Act, because the cigarettes NWS was selling, importing, and causing
to be imported into Idaho were not listed on the Idallo Directory. R. pp. 52-54, 968,
1002-6\.

9 The Idaho Directory is maintained and administered by the Attomey General, pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 39-8403 of the Complementary Act. The Attorney General has made the Idaho Directory
available online at hltp;llwww2.state.id.us/ag/consumeritobacco/directory index.htm. The Idaho
Directory, in part, lists the various participating and nonparticipating manufacturers and the cigarette
brands of these companies that may lawfully be sold in Idaho.
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(2) All of the cigarettes NWS sold, imported, and caused to be imported into Idaho were
at wholesale and NWS engaged in these sales transactions without it first obtaining
the cigarette wholesale permit required by Idaho's Cigarette Tax Act. R. pp. 48-49.
(3) NWS is not an Indian. It is a business chartered by the Sac and Fox Tribe of
Oklahoma. R. p. 121. Accordingly, as established below, see infra pp. 20-21, it is not
a tribe nor an instrumentality of a tribe, and it is not a member of any tribe, let alone
the tribe where its principal place of business is located, which is the Seneca Nation
Reservation, located in the State of New York. Jd.
(4) The recipient ofNWS's cigarette sales, Warpath, Inc., is an Idaho corporation. R. pp.
456-57. It is not an Indian. Accordingly, it, too, is neither a tribe nor an
instrumentality of a tribe; and it is not a member of any tribe. Warpath paid for and
received NWS's cigarettes in Idaho where it is located on the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation in Plummer, Idaho. Jd.; see also R. pp. 1008-1061.
NWS's violations of the Complementary Act are straightforward. As previously noted,
the Act, in part, makes it unlawful for any person to sell, import, or cause to be imported into
Idaho cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand which the person knows or should
know are intended for sale or distribution in Idaho and which are not included on the Idaho
Directory. Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(b) and (c). The undisputed fact is that over a five-year
period NWS sold, imported, and caused to be imported into Idaho over 100 million cigarettes
that were never on the Directory. This is a violation of the Complementary Act. Maybee, 148
Idaho at 535-36, 224 P.3d at 1124-25 (Internet cigarette seller violated the Complementary Act
by selling and offering for sale cigarettes not on the Idaho Directory).
Idaho's Cigarette Tax Act claim is equally straightforward. Despite selling millions of
these cigarettes at wholesale to an Idaho retailer, NWS never applied for nor held a cigarette
wholesale permit as required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1) of the Cigarette Tax Act.
The District Court ruled that NWS was in violation of these laws. The law is clear and
the facts undisputed and indicate that the District Court was correct in its rulings.
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IV.

IDAHO COURTS HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER SALES
AND SHIPMENTS OF CIGARETTES FROM A RESERVATION IN ONE STATE
TO ANOTHER RESERVATION IN IDAHO
NWS contends that because it sells and ships its cigarettes from its principal place of

business on a reservation in N ew York, and the recipient of its cigarettes is located on a separate
reservation located in Idaho, Idaho's laws do not apply to it. NWS argues that it can act with
impunity, i.e., that there is nothing Idaho can do about these "reservation-to-reservation"
cigarette sales. NWS's argument is an attack on an Idaho court's subject matter jurisdiction over
NWS and its sales activities. NWS errs. The case law indicates that neither NWS nor its sales
are beyond the reach of applicable controlling Idaho law.

A.

This Court and the United States Supreme Court Have Upheld Applicatiou
of State Law to an Indian's Activities Off His Own Reservation

NWS contends that the Indian Commerce Clause (and "interpretations of federal law")
preempts the Complementary and Idaho MSA Acts as they relate to NWS' s cigarette sales.
Appellant Brief, p. 17.10 Applicable precedent indicates, however, that the Indian Commerce
Clause provides no basis for NWS to assert preemption of Idaho's state law claims here.
First, it is important to note that the "central function" of the Indian Commerce Clause,
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, "is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs." Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). There is

10 NWS's reference to Idaho's MSA Act is curious. Idaho has not alleged NWS is violating this Act.
The reasou for this is that the MSA Act imposes duties upon tobacco product manufacturers, not tobacco
wholesalers like NWS. See Idaho Code § 39-7803. The Complementary Act, on the other hand,
encompasses wholesalers because it applies, in part, to "any person" who acquires, holds, owns,
possesses, transports, imports, and/or causes to be imported for sale and distribution in Idaho cigarettes.
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3). That is precisely what NWS has done here and why the Complementary Act
applies to it. In addition, because NWS is wholesaling its cigarettes, Idaho's Cigarette Tax Act applies.
See Idaho Code §§ 63-2502(a) and 63-2503(1) (wholesaler is every person who purchases, sells, or
distributes cigarettes to other wholesalers or to retailers for the purpose of resale and persons who
wholesale cigarettes must have a permit from the Tax Commission). The Idaho MSA Act is neither at
issue nor a basis for Idaho's claims here.
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nothing in the Indian Connnerce Clause that operates to preempt or curtail application of state
law akin to the negative or d0I111ant function possessed by the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Thus, in Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), the
Supreme Court rejected the United States' request to "rely on the dormant Indian Connnerce
Clause ... to hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident tribe are presumptively
beyond the reach of state law even in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, thus
placing the burden on the State to demonstrate that its intrusion is either condoned by Congress
or justified by a compelling need to protect legitimate, specified state interests other than the
generalized desire to collect revenue." Id. at 845. In the Court's view, "the existing pre-emption
analysis governing these cases is sufficiently sensitive to many of the concerns expressed by the
Solicitor General" since, "[a]lthough clearer rules and presumptions promote the interest in
simplifying litigation, our precedents announcing the scope of pre-emption analysis in this area
provide sufficient guidance to state courts and also allow for more flexible consideration of the
federal, state, and tribal interests at issue." Id. at 846; accord Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192.
In sum, the Indian Commerce Clause merely empowers Congress to act and has no independent
preemptive function such to support NWS's claim of preemption here. This Court has analyzed
these same cases and reached the same conclusion. Maybee, 148 Idaho at 533, 224 P.3d at 1122;
see also Omaha Tribe v. Miller, 311 F. Supp. 2d 816,822 (S.D. Iowa 2004); Ward v. New York,

291 F. Supp. 2d 188, 199 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
That the Indian Commerce Clause has no preemptive effect does not mean that there
might not be federal law at play or preemption issues to address. Review of the relevant federal
law indicates, however, that neither application of the Complementary nor Cigarette Tax Acts in
this case is preempted.
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Where federal Indian law is concerned, several principles are important to note. First, it
IS

settled that a State can regulate activities of tribal members that are off reservation. For

example, in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), the Supreme Court was
asked to prohibit New Mexico from imposing a gross receipts tax on revenue generated from a
tribal ski resort and a use tax on materials employed in constructing the resort's lifts. The resort
was located adjacent to but outside the tribe's reservation on land leased from the United States
Forest Service. Jd. at 146. The resort's location was critical because "in the special area of state
taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no
satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried
on within the boundaries of the reservation." Jd. at 148. "[T]ribal activities conducted outside
the reservation present different considerationsL]" however, and in that situation "[a]bsent
express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally
been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the
State." Jd. at 148-49.
With that principle in mind, the Court found the gross receipts tax permissible, given the
resort's location, but deemed the use tax preempted by virtue of a provision in the Indian
Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465, which proscribes taxation of land taken into trust for a
tribe or tribal member.

On the latter point, it reasoned that "the lease arrangement here in

question was sufficient to bring the Tribe's interest in the land within the immunity afforded by §
465," 411 U.S. at 155 n.lI, since the ski lifts had been permanently attached to the land and
"[t]he jurisdictional basis for use taxes is the use of the property in the State." Jd. at 158. The
differing result with regard to the use tax thus derived from the combination of an explicit
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congressional directive satisfying the "express federal law to the contrary" exception to the
general rule and the nature of the conduct that triggered the tax obligation under state law.
The Supreme Court applied Mescalero Apache more recently in Wagnon v. Prairie Band

Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), where it upheld imposition of a state fuel tax on an offreservation distributor with respect to purchases by a tribal retailer for on-reservation sale. The
Court rejected the proposition that the tax's validity must be assessed under the interest-balancing
test governing on-reservation transactions prescribed in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.

Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), a case relied upon by NWS and discussed further below, because
"[w]e have taken an altogether different course, by contrast, when a State asserts its taxing
authority outside of Indian Country."

Id.. at 112.

That "altogether different course" was

Mescalero Apache which controlled in light of the off-reservation "where" of the Kansas fuel
tax-i. e., the fact that the tax accrued upon receipt of the fuel by the distributor at its offreservation place of business. The Court reasoned, "the 'use, sale or delivery' that triggers tax
liability is the sale or delivery of the fuel to the distributor." Id. at 107 (emphasis added).

Mescalero Apache and Wagnon establish the fundamental framework against which
NWS's Indian law-based preemption claim must be measured.

The requirements of the

Complementary or Cigarette Tax Acts are "trigger[ ed]" for present purposes by NWS' s
introduction of tobacco into Idaho through its sales and its importing, and causing to be
imported into Idaho, of cigarettes not lawful to be sold.

The triggering "where" of the

transaction is thus NWS's introduction into Idaho of the contraband cigarettes, not NWS's New
York place of business.

That NWS is located on a New York reservation is simply of no

relevance here.
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This Court reached the same conclusion in Maybee, applying the Complementary Act to
an Indian Internet cigarette seller who situated his business on a reservation in New York, indeed
the same one where NWS is located. The Internet cigarette seller, Maybee, an actual member of
the tribe where he was located, argued that federal law preempted application of the
Complementary Act to his cigarette sales activities. This Court rejected that argument, holding
that the Complementary Act does not regulate the on-reservation activity of Maybee's Internet
cigarette sales, but rather his "introduction of Noncompliant Cigarettes into Idaho," Maybee,
148 Idaho at 534, 224 P.3d at 1123 (emphasis added). Because this constitutes conduct going off
his reservation, pursuant to applicable federal Indian law precedent Maybee was properly subject
to the Complementary Act's provisions. Jd., citing Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148-49. 11
In short, the Maybee case (and the precedent it relies upon and is supported by) stands for
the proposition that selling cigarettes that are destined for Idaho but are non-compliant under the

11 It bears noting that in arriving at its decision in Maybee, this Court also relied upon Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353 (2001). The Hicks Court's ruling is instructive here:

When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally
inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." When, however, state interests ontside
the reservation are implicated, States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on
tribal land, as exemplified by our decision in [Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)]. In that case, Indians were selling cigarettes on their
reservation to nonmembers from off reservation, withont collecting the state cigarette tax. We
held that the State could require the Tribes to collect the tax from nonmembers, and could
'impose at least "minimal" burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and collecting the
tax[.]"
533 U.S. at 362. (Emphasis added; some citations omitted).
This Court in Maybee also relied upon other relevant precedent. For example, in Department of
Health and Human Services v. Maybee, 965 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 2009), the Maine Supreme Court ruled that
Maine's tobacco license requirements applied to Maybee, because while Maybee is an Indian, his
"interactions with consumers in Maine extend beyond the boundaries of [his] reservation." The Maine
court held, like this Court (see Maybee, 148 Idaho at 534-35, 224 P.3d at 1123-24), that "[a]ctivity of
tribal members that takes place within the reservation but has an impact outside the reservation may be
regulated by the states." Id. at 57-58. Decisions announced after this Court's decision in Maybee
continue to be in accord with it. See State v. Maybee, 232 P.3d 970 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
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Complementary Act is conduct that gives Idaho courts subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the
requirements of that Act. Maybee's membership in the Seneca Tribe did not insulate him from
application

of Idaho's

laws

to

activity

that

involved

selling

cigarettes

to

Idaho

consumers. Likewise, the Indian status ofNWS's owner (NWS itself is not an Indian, see, infra,
pp. 20-21), does not somehow immunize NWS here with respect to its illegal cigarettes sales to
Idaho-based Warpath, Inc]2
B.

The Supreme Court's "Bracker" Test Is Not Applicable to this Case; Even if
it Were Applicable, it Would Support Application of Idaho Law in this Case

NWS mistakenly relies upon White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980) as support for its position.

Appellant's Brief, p. 37.

Bracker involved the question

whether Arizona could impose motor carrier license and use fuel taxes on a nontribal firm with
respect to on-reservation hauling of tribal timber pursuant to a contract with the resident tribe
and sets forth the following test for when a State may regulate commercial transactions between
tribes and nonmembers that occur on reservation:
In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes
in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that
have developed from historical traditions of tribal independence. This inquiry is not
dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has
called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests
at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of
state authority would violate federal law.

448 U.S. at 144-45.

12
NWS spends several pages seeking to distinguish Maybee, mainly on the grounds that whereas
Maybee sold his cigarettes to people throughout Idaho, NWS only sold its cigarettes to an Idaho
corporation located on a reservation in Idaho. Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-16. This is a distinction without
a difference. As discussed below, Warpath's location on a separate reservation in Idaho does not create
any constitutional or statutory impediment to Idaho courts exercising subject matter jurisdiction here.
This is even more so given that Warpath is not an Indian, a member of the tribe upon whose reservation it
is located, or an instrumentality of such tribe. See infra pp. 19-22.
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Bracker dealt with state taxation of an on-reservation commercial activity between a tribe

and a nonmember.

It simply does not apply here because NWS' s sales and shipments of

cigarettes to a retail business in Idaho extend beyond the boundaries of the reservation where
NWS is located and because NWS is a corporation, not a tribal member. 13 This is the same
conclusion this Court reached in the Maybee case where Maybee had argued that his conduct at
issue occurred on his reservation. See Maybee, 148 Idaho at 535, 224 P.3d at 1124 ("Where the
regulated conduct occurs off-reservation, application of the Bracker balancing test is
inappropriate . . . . Here, the regulated conduct occurred off-reservation, and so the Bracker
balancing test does not apply. ") (Citations omitted).
In any event, even were Bracker applicable, it would not per se bar Idaho law here.
Bracker instead mandates a test that balances applicable federal, state and tribal interests. While

umlecessary, applying that test here shows that enforcement of the Complementary and Cigarette
Tax Acts would be upheld.
Concerning the federal interest, "the federal government has been generally supportive of
state regulation of cigarette sales." Ward, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 204. For example, federal lawspecifically 42 U.S.C. Section 300x-26-encourages States to adopt laws that prohibit sales of
tobacco products to persons under the age of 18 by providing grants from the Department of
Health and Human Services. Similarly, federal law also supports state cigarette tax efforts. For
example, a provision of federal law lmown as the "Jenkins Act," codified at 15 U.S.C. § 376,

The Supreme Court has made clear that States have the authority "absent a congressional
prohibition[J to exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over non-Indians located on
reservation lands." County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 257-58 (1992). Consequently, even were it assumed arguendo that NWS's transactions
occurred wholly within the reservation where it is located, it would stand in no better shoes for Indian
law-based preemption purposes than any other nonmember entity engaged in the same activity, because it
is not a member of the tribe where it is located. NWS does not suggest (and cannot) that the latter would
be immune from application of the Complementary Act or the tax provisions at issue here.
13
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mandates that out-of-state cigarette retailers report monthly to a State's tax or revenue
commission all sales made to residents of the tax commission's state 14 In short, federal law
supports, not undercuts, state regulation of cigarette sales and shipments. NWS points to no
contrary congressional directive with respect to the Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts.
Concerning Idaho, its interest in regulating tobacco is self-evident. As noted above, the
Legislature has found that smoking presents serious public health concerns to Idaho and its
citizens. See Idaho Code § 39-780l(a). The Legislature further dete=ined that the financial
burdens imposed on the State by smoking should be borne by tobacco companies, rather than by
the State, to the extent that such companies either determine to enter into settlement agreements
with the State or are found culpable by the courts. See Idaho Code § 39-780l(d). The State's
interest in regulating the sale of this dangerous product cannot be gainsaid. Idaho also has an
interest in the effective and efficient administration of its cigarette tax laws. It cannot administer
these laws if wholesalers, with impunity, can ignore the requirement that they obtain a permit
from the Tax Commission and comply with its various reporting obligations. In short, Idaho's
interests are significant and NWS says nothing to undercut them either.
The final consideration-the relevant tribal interest-is not helpful to NWS. The burden
upon the Seneca Nation's tribal interests in NWS (a business entity that while located on the
Seneca Reservation is incorporated under a different tribe's corporate code) complying with
Idaho law with respect to its cigarette sales to Idaho businesses is not apparent. It is no more
intrusive on NWS's time and resources than the record-keeping and tax collection duties

14 Congress recently amended the Jenkins Act, in part, to provide States even more comprehensive and
complete reporting of the interstate shipment of cigarettes. See Pub. L. No. I I 1-154, 124 Stat. 1087
(2010) (Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT) Act). The expanded reporting requirements are set
forth in Section 2 of the PACT Act and amended 15 U.S.C. § 376.
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approved in Moe v. Corifederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976),15 and

Colville. 16
In short, even if Bracker's test were to be employed here, it would support Idaho's
application of its laws to NWS. In the end, the relevant cases strongly reject the immunity NWS
seeks here and teach that NWS enjoys no special status in this case merely because its principal
place of business exists on the Seneca Nation's New York reservation.
C.

There Is No "Reservation-to-Reservation" Immunity for Cigarette Sales
Recognized in Federal Indian Law

Faced with the precedent arrayed against it, NWS takes a different tact, advocating a
position not recognized by any court: the recipient of its cigarettes, while an Idaho corporation,
is nevertheless owned by Indians and located on a reservation in Idaho, and this prevents Idaho
law from applying to NWS' s unlawful activities. Whether one looks at the status of the recipient
of the cigarettes or the recipient's location, NWS's arguments fail.
Before addressing the substance of NWS's "reservation-to-reservation" immunity
defense, it is important to note the flaws with its application here. First, as noted above and as
found by this Court in Maybee, 148 Idaho at 534, 224 P.3d at 1123, the regulatory incidence of
Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(c) of the Complementary Act, applies, in part, to the act of
introducing cigarettes into Idaho for the purpose of distribution or sale. The same is true for the

15 Moe addressed Montana's method for assessment and collection of personal property taxes as applied
to reservation Indians. Moe contains four holdings, one of which is relevant here: that Montana conld
require tribal retailers to collect and remit cigarette taxes imposed on non-Indians with respect to
reservation sales. 425 U.S. at 480-81, 483. As to this holding, the Supreme Court stated that requiring an
Indian tribal seller to collect a tax validly imposed on a non-member of the tribe is a minimal burden that
does not frustrate tribal self-government and is not prohibited by Congress. Id. at 483.
16 In Colville, the Supreme Court, in addition to upholding Washington's sales and cigarettes taxes on
on-reservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe, also upheld Washington'S authority to impose
robust regulatory obligations on tribal retailers with respect to nonmember cigarette sales-i.e.,
maintaining "detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in addition to simply precollecting the tax."
447 U.S. at lSI. It reasoned that "[tJhe simple collection burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax
on tribal smokeshops is legally indistinguishable from the collection burden upheld in Moe." Id. at 159.
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Cigarette Tax Act-it covers, in part, the act of importing cigarettes into this State. Idaho Code
§ 63-2508 ("No person may import cigarettes ... unless he shall have qualified under [the
Cigarette Tax Act] as a wholesaler and obtained a permit, as provided for in section 63-2503,
Idaho Code"). The triggering event is thus not the actual receipt of the non-compliant cigarettes
by a purchaser but the requisite intent coupled with the act of introduction of the cigarettes into
Idaho. Accordingly, under the Complementary Act, who actually receives the cigarettes and
where in the State they are actually received is of no legal import.
Second, as noted above, see supra p. 4, NWS's cigarettes do not actually go from one

reservation to another. They first go to Nevada and the Nevada Foreign Trade Zone, a creature
of state and federal law, where they are stored pending shipment. R. p. 199. The fact of the
matter is that NWS's cigarettes were not (and never were) shipped directly from the Seneca
Reservation in New York to the Coeur d' Alene Reservation in Idaho without there being an
intermediate and indeterminate stop along the way. Putting aside these facts, however, whether
one analyzes NWS's arguments based upon the status of the recipient of the cigarettes or the
location of that recipient, the law does not support NWS.
Considering first the recipient of NWS' s cigarettes-Warpath, Inc.-it is crucial to
understand that it is not a member of an Indian tribe but is instead an Idaho corporation created
pursuant to Idaho law. See R. pp. 456-57. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 47475 (2003) (corporations have identities separate from that of their owners); Baraga Prods., Inc.
v. Comm'r, 971 F. Supp. 294, 296 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (incorporated business entity not an

enrolled member of an Indian tribe simply because its sole shareholder is); aff'd 156 F.3d 1228
(6 th Cir. 1998) (unpublished op.); id. at 298 ("a corporation is not an 'Indian' for purposes of
immunity" from the application of state law). As an Idaho corporation, Warpath is not a member
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of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. It is not even an Indian. It thus has no special status on the Coeur
d'Alene Reservation.

See Colville, 447 U.S. at 161 (,,[nJon-members [IndiansJ are not

constituents of the governing Tribe. . .. [TJhose Indians stand on the same footing as nonIndians resident on the reservation.,,)17

Hence, NWS's preemption arguments based upon

Warpath being the recipient of its cigarettes are of no avail]8
NWS's preemption inquiry is equally unsuccessful if we look at the ultimate destination
of its cigarettes, a city located on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation in Idaho. This is so because, as
noted above, the Supreme Court has "recognized the rights of States, absent a congressional
prohibition, to exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over non-Indians located on
reservation lands." County a/Yakima, 502 U.S. at 257-58. Persons not tribal members, in other
words, enjoy no special dispensation from state law with respect to transactions with other
nomnembers, regardless of whether they are located on a reservation. This is equally true for
corporations owned by Indians. Thus, because Warpath, Inc. is not a member of the Coeur
d' Alene Tribe, let alone an Indian at all, its location on the Coeur d' Alene Reservation is of no
moment. It certainly is not a shield for NWS to use to avoid being held accountable for its
violations of Idaho law.
NWS's argument that state law cannot apply to sales that originate on one reservation and
terminate on another reservation has not been accepted by the courts.

In fact, it has been

rejected. The Supreme Court has ruled that Native American tribes do not have "supersovereign
These rules apply equally to NWS-as an incorporated entity, it is not an Indiml or a tribal member of
the Seneca Nation where it conducts its business or the Sac and Fox Tribe where it was incorporated.
18 NWS contends that as regards Warpath, hlC., "the conduct at issue is trade between Indians located on
a reservation." Appellant's Brief, p. 24. As has been established, this is simply wrong. Rather, the
conduct at issue is trade between two non-Indiml corporations located on different reservations. Further,
NWS glosses over the fact that Warpath sells its cigarettes, in part, to members of the general public,
including persons who are not Indimls, let alone members of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe. See R. pp. 192-93,
and the Affidavit of Roderick Howard, filed-stamped December 29, 20 I 0, which by the October 5, 2011
order of this Court was added to the record. See also p. 31 n. 22 infra.
17
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authority to interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax" activities within its
borders. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 466 (1995); see also Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 734 (1983) ("Congress did not intend to make tribal members 'super
citizens' who could trade in a traditionally regulated substance free from all but self-imposed
regulations.") Time and again the Supreme Court has emphasized that Indian law preemption
focuses on commerce within a tribe, not between two different tribes and its members. Rice,
463 U.S. at 720 & n. 7. Thus, as noted above, it is for this reason that the Supreme Court has
ruled that a State, for example, can require a tribal retailer on its reservation to obtain a state
license for any sales to "all non-Indians and all Indians who are not members of the particular
tribe." Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Henry, No. CIV 10-019-JHP, 2010 WL 1078438, at *3
(E.D. Okla. Mar. 18,2010), citing Rice, 463 U.S. at 720 & n. 7, and Colville, 447 U.S. at 16061.
As the federal district court in Oklahoma noted, quoting from the State's brief:
What [NWSj ultimately seeks in this case is something that no other sovereign has-the ability of a Tribe to immunize goods made within its borders from taxation and
regulation by other sovereigns once those goods leave its boundaries. Just as China or
New York State may not decree that their products are immune from Oklahoma taxation
when those goods enter this State, neither may a Native American tribe claim such
special treatment.

Id. at *3 (internal citations omitted).
In summary, there is no such thing in the law as "reservation-to-reservation" or "supersovereignty" preemption that immunizes NWS from its over one hundred million illegal cigarette
sales and importation thereof into Idaho. The law pays no heed merely because NWS is owned
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by an Indian and located on one reservation and Warpath, Inc., is owned by other Indians of a
different tribe and is located on another reservation. 19

D.

NWS's Idaho Cases Either Are Not Relevant or Have Been Effectively
Overruled by Subseqnent Decisions of the United State Supreme Court

NWS cites extensively to two decisions of this Court as support that Idaho courts are
without subject matter jurisdiction here. The first is Mahoney v. State Tax Comm 'n, 96 Idaho 59,
524 P.2d 187 (1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1089. Mahoney addressed the issue of whether the
State could tax on-reservation sales of cigarettes by an Indian seller. Mahoney ruled that the
imposition of Idaho state cigarette taxes upon on-reservation sales by an Indian seller are
preempted, regardless of whether the purchasers were Indians or non-Indians. See id., at 62, 524
P.2d at 190. Mahoney grounded its ruling exclusively upon the Indian Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. Id., at 62,524 P.2d at 190.
NWS's reliance upon Mahoney is not well taken.

Mahoney has been effectively

overruled by subsequent United States Supreme Court cases in at least two ways.

These

decisions, which have been discussed above, establish as a general matter that the Indian
Commerce Clause does not preempt state law-see Ramah Navajo, 458 U.S. at 845-46, and
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at In-and as a specific matter that federal law does not bar a State
from imposing cigarette taxes upon on-reservation sales to nonmembers of the tribe.

See

19 Equally unavailing is NWS's prolonged discussion of tribal sovereignty. See Appellant's Brief, pp.
9-14. No tribe is involved in this case. In fact, as oft noted, neither NWS nor Warpath are Indians, tribal

members, or instrumentalities of a tribe. However, even if either NWS or Warpath were Indians, the
sovereign immunity of a tribe is of no relevance to them or this case:
Individual Native Americans acting for their own purposes are no more entitled to the immunity
from suit afforded a tribe than a private state citizen engaging in his or her own business is
entitled to the State's sovereign immunity. Tribal freedom from suit is an attribute of Indian
sovereignty and may not and should not be extended to cover private entities operating for private
gain based solely on the ethnicity of their owners.
Oklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply Company, 237 P.3d 199,210 (Okla. 2010).
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Co/ville, 447 U.S. at 150-62. In short, Mahoney is no longer good law on these two issues.

While these holdings are not on point in this case-this case is not about Idaho's right to tax onreservation cigarette sales to non-members of a tribe-its analysis is no longer valid or of help in
analyzing cases such as the present one.
The other Idaho case NWS cites often is State v. Marek, 112 Idabo 860, 736 P.2d 1314
(1987). In Marek, the defendant, a member of the Nez Perce Tribe, was charged and convicted
in State court with various crimes of violence committed on the Nez Perce Reservation. The
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, asserts exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over various
crimes committed by an Indian on a reservation. The defendant contended that Idaho state courts
lacked jurisdiction over him under the Major Crimes Act, which this Court agreed with respect to
the crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act. Id. at 865, 736 P.3d at 1319. The defendant
went further, however, and also contested that the State could not prosecute him for crimes not
covered by the Maj or Crimes Act because Idaho had not amended Article 21, § 19 of Idabo' s
Constitution to allow for the assertion of jurisdiction for certain other crimes like child abuse,
which Congress had granted States to exercise if they would assume such authority. See Pub. L.
No. 83-280,67 Stat. 588 (1953) (PL 280) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162,25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1325, and 28 U.S.C. § 1360.

The Marek Court disagreed, noting that Congress'

granting Idaho such jurisdiction under PL 280, and Idabo's exercise of such authority thereof, is
not barred by Article 21, § 19. Marek, 112 Idabo at 866, 736 P.2d at 1320.
Marek does not support NWS.

First, and fundamentally, there

IS

no express

Congressional action like the Major Crimes Act here to preempt application of the
Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts to the facts of this case.
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Second, NWS's use of Marek to argue that "[t]he Idaho Constitution prohibits Idaho from

exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Indian Country," Appellant's Brief, p. 30, misses the
mark. As noted above and as was declared by this Court in Maybee, 148 Idaho at 534, 224 PJd
at 1123, the regulatory incidence of Idaho Code § 39-8403(3)(c) of the Complementary Act,
applies merely to the act of introducing cigarettes into Idaho for the purpose of distribution or
sale. The same conclusion applies to application of Idaho's Cigarette Tax Act. The triggering
event is not, as noted previously, the actual receipt of the non-compliant cigarettes by a
purchaser nor the recipient's location, but the requisite intent coupled with the act of
introducing the cigarettes into Idaho. Thus, who actually receives the cigarettes or where in the

State they are received is of no import?O It simply cannot be argued that Idaho is "exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over Indian country." In any event, applicable United States Supreme
Court precedent interpreting language exactly like Article 21, § 19 indicates that such provisions
are not a bar to the exercise of state authority in cases like this one. See infra pp. 35_36 21

E.

Conclusion

Controlling law upholds the exercise by an Idaho court of subject matter jurisdiction over
NWS's illegal sale and introduction into Idaho, at wholesale, of over 100 million cigarettes. The
Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts apply and there is nothing in federal law that precludes

20 NWS's citation to Goodman Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission., 136 Idaho 53, 28 PJd 996
(2001) requires less discussion. NWS cites to Goodman for the proposition that "the Complementary Act
cannot be enforced because the' legal incidence ... rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made
inside Indian country.'" Appellant's Brief, p. 23. As discussed above, this is wrong. This Court has
concluded in Maybee, 148 Idaho at 534, 224 PJd at 1123, that the regulatory incidence of the
Complementary Act applies merely to the act of introducing cigarettes into Idaho for the purpose of
distribution or sale.
21 Because NWS also relies heavily on Article 21, § 19 in its argnments related to personal jurisdiction,
Idaho opted to respond more fu lly to this provision in that context, which can be found at pages 35-36
infra. The discussion there applies equally here.
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the exercise of such jurisdiction here. NWS and Warpath's locations on reservations are of no
constitutional or statutory significance in this case.
V.

IDAHO COURTS HAVE STATUTORY
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NWS

AUTHORITY

TO

EXERCISE

NWS argues that because the recipient of its unlawful cigarettes is located on the Coeur
d'Alene Reservation, Idaho's long arm statute also does not apply to, and does not confer upon
Idaho courts, personal jurisdiction over it. Appellant's Brief, pp. 31-35. NWS errs.
When "the state has expressed its interest in the subject matter of the suit," jurisdiction
may be exercised over the person or entity through a "special jurisdictional statute" to the limits
allowed by due process. Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons Canst. Co., 114 Idaho 704, 715, 760 P.2d
1120,1131 (1988) overruled on other grounds; Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 81, 803 P.2d at
987.

Here, there are three statutory bases authorizing an Idaho court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over NWS.
A.

Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction bv an Idaho Court Over NWS is
Authorized by the Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts

The Complementary Act contains an express legislative direction that all cigarette sales
and shipments to Idaho retailers, like Warpath, Inc., comply with its provisions. Idaho Code §
39-8403. Idaho alleges NWS ignored and violated these requirements. Section 63-2503 of the
Cigarette Tax Act further requires tobacco wholesalers like NWS to acquire a permit, which it
has not. Sections 39-8404 of the Complementary Act and 63-2519 of the Cigarette Tax Act, in
turn, authorize Idaho courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over wholesale shippers like NWS
for these violations.
B.

Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction bv Idaho Courts Over NWS is Also
Authorized by Idaho's Long-Arm Statute

NWS's arguments to the contrary, personal jurisdiction is also properly exercisable under
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Idaho's long-arm statute. This statute confers personal jurisdiction in this case under Idaho Code
Sections 5-514(a), covering business transactions, and 5-514(b), covering tortious acts.
Idaho's long-arm statute is "designed to provide a forum for Idaho residents, is remedial
legislation of the most fundamental nature and should be liberally construed." St. Alphonsus
Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. State, 123 Idaho 739, 743, 852 P.2d 491, 495 (1993); see also Purco Fleet
Servs., Inc. v. State Dep't of Fin. , 140 Idaho 121, 124,90 P.3d 346,349 (2004). There is nothing

in the long-arm statute to suggest that it provide less of a forum to the State itself than it provides
its residents. The law should be "interpreted as broadly as possible to extend jurisdiction to the
maximum extent permitted by due process." Schwilling v. Horne, 105 Idaho 294, 298, 669 P.2d
183,187 (1983).
1.

NWS Has Transacted Business iu Idaho Under Idaho Code Sectiou 5
S14(a)

Section 5-514(a) of Idaho's Long-Ann Statute authorizes jurisdiction in cases involving
"the transaction of any business within this state," defined as "the doing of any act for the
purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or
enhance the business purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company,
association or corporation." Acts done either "in person or through an agent" are encompassed.
Id.

Section 5-514 was "designed to provide a forum for in-state residents in a world of

increasingly complex commercial transactions" and should be interpreted broadly. S. Idaho Pipe
& Steel v. Cal-Cut Pipe, 98 Idaho 495, 497, 567 P.2d 1246, 1248 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.

1056 (1978).
A nonresident defendant may be subject to jurisdiction "by reason of doing business in
the state" even though at no time is it "physically present therein." B.B.P. Ass 'n v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 91 Idaho 259, 265, 420 P.2d 134, 140 (1966). Nor need the benefit realized by the

27

defendant be direct: "[I]t is seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other
States ... that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, however, does not make it
any the less ess[e]ntial to the conduct of his business."

Id.

A nonresident defendant's

relationship with business entities that "were the agencies or instrumentalities by means of which
[it] carried on the sales and servicing of its products in this state" constitutes "doing business in
Idaho" even if those entities "were independent contractors and not agents ... in the ordinary
sense of that term." Id. at 263, 420 P.2d at 138. A manufacturer's sale of its goods to another
business it knows will distribute them "nationally, and specifically in Idaho" is purposeful
availment of the benefits of conducting business within the State. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh v. AerohawkAviation, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1106 (D. Idaho 2003).
As noted above, the facts indicate that NWS sold, shipped, and caused to be shipped
into Idaho large volumes of cigarettes on an ongoing and continuous basis. NWS specifically
directed its product to stores in Idaho and gained benefit and advantage from these sales. This
constitutes conducting business in Idaho under Idaho's long-ann statute.
2,

NWS Has Committed Tortious Acts in Idaho Under Idaho Code
Section 5-514(b)

Idaho's long-arm statute also authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases
involving "the commission of a tortious act within this state." Idaho Code § 5-514(b). The
conduct giving rise to the injury need not have taken place in Idaho. McAnally v. Bonjac, 137
Idaho 488, 50 P .3d 983 (2002) (personal jurisdiction found where field-burning by farmer in
Washington caused respiratory injury in Idaho). "[A]n allegation that an injury has occurred in
Idaho in a tortious mauner is sufficient to invoke the tortious act language of Idaho Code § 5514(b)." St. A1phonsus, 123 Idaho at 743,852 P.2d at 495.
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A tort, of course, is "the infringement of a right created otherwise than by contract."

Hanes v. Idaho Irr. Co., 21 Idaho 512, 520, 122 P. 859, 861 (1912). More recently, this Court
has defined a tort simply as "the wrongful invasion of an interest protected by the law." Just's,

Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978). Torts can be
common law torts, and they can be statutory torts. Thus, courts have held that violations of
various laws constitute a tort.

See e.g., St. Alphonsus, 123 Idaho at 743, 852 P.2d at 495

(whether Washington's exercise of legislative power to promulgate reimbursement rates is
classifiable as a tort is "a factual question and irrelevant to our examination of jurisdiction under
the long-ann statute"); Daniel v. Am. Ed. of Emergency Med., 802 F. Supp. 912, 919 (W.D.N.Y.
1992) ("An action alleging violations of antitrust laws is a claim for injuries sustained, and
therefore is in the nature of a tort and state long-arm jurisdiction would apply."); U S. Dental

Inst. v. Am. Ass 'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 571 (N.D.Il1.1975) (alleged unlawful
"restraint [of trade1constitutes a tortious act").
Concerning a claim sounding in tort, there is no need for the defendant directly to do
business in Idaho. Nat'l Union Fire Insur., 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1102 (personal jurisdiction under
Idaho long-ann statute is proper in claim against Pennsylvania manufacturer of airplane
component parts distributed to Kansas plane manufacturer, when plane crash occurred in Idaho);

Duignan v. A.H Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134,559 P.2d 750 (1977) (finding personal jurisdiction
over Virginia manufacturer after plaintiff developed infection in Idaho from intrauterine device
inserted in California); Doggett v. Elect. Corp., 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969) (jurisdiction
over out-of-state component manufacturer found when industrial boiler assembled out-of-state
exploded injuring Idaho man).
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NWS's cigarette sales and shipments violate the Complementary and Cigarette Tax Acts,
and their introduction into Idaho of the illegal cigarettes means the injury from NWS's conduct
occurred in Idaho. These violations of Idaho law are enough to constitute the commission of
tortious acts under Section 5-514(b) and confer personal jurisdiction over NWS for the conduct
at issue.
VI.

THIS COURT MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY
JURISDICTION OVER NWS

EXERCISE

PERSONAL

NWS also contends that Due Process was violated as a result of the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over it. Appellant's Brief, pp. 33-35. Applicable law does not support NWS.
A.

Legal Standards for Determining Whether the Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction Conforms To Due Process

Due process analysis regarding personal jurisdiction has two prongs. The court must
determine whether the defendant has minimum contacts-purposefully availed itself-with the
forum state and then whether exercise of such jurisdiction is supported by traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 76,803 P.2d at 982.
The United States Supreme Court has recently described the first prong of due process
analysis as focusing on whether the defendant "purposefully" directed activities toward the
forum state or intends to derive benefits from its markets. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011); J McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct.

2780,2788 (2011) (plurality opinion).
Due process is not intended to act as a "territorial shield" whereby defendants can escape
jurisdiction through artful structuring of commercial relations. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985). "[W]here individuals 'purposefully derive benefit' from their interstate
activities, it may well be llilfair to allow them to escape having to aCCOlli1t in other States for
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consequences that arise proximately from such activities." Id.. (emphasis added; citations
omitted). That a foreign corporation avails itself of "the benefits of an economic market in the
forum State" is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction "even if it has no physical presence in
the State." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992).
The second prong of due process personal jurisdiction analysis inquires as to "whether
the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice. '"
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (citation omitted). Factors to consider include I) "the burden on

the defendant"; 2) "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute"; 3) "the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief'; 4) "the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies"; and 5) "the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Id. at 477. These factors
"sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required." Id.
It cannot be gainsaid but that NWS has purposefully directed its activities toward

Idaho-its 100 million-plus cigarettes sold and shipped to Idaho over a five-year time period
attest to that. 22 Nor can it be reasonably disputed that applying these factors here supports the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over NWS by Idaho courts.

It is equally clear that NWS's cigarettes sales have off-reservation effects. The 100-plus million
cigarettes NWS sold and shipped to Warpath, Inc., constitute a staggering volume for one retailer and
plainly serve a market far larger than the members of the Coeur d' Alene Tribe. According to the 2010
Census, there are 1,506 Indians living on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. U.S. Census Bureau; Census
2010 Summary File 1; generated by Beth Kittelmann using American FactFinder;
http://factfindeLcensus.gov (December 1, 2011). NWS's sale and shipment of these millions of cigarettes
defies any suggestion that such a volume would be purchased exclusively by adult Coeur d'Alene Indians
(who constitute a subset of the 1,506 Indians living on the Coeur d'Alene Reservation) and NWS cannot
contend to the contrary. Clearly, large volumes of the cigarettes being sold to Warpath ultimately are
being purchased by nonmembers of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, resulting in large off-reservation effects.
22
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First, it is reasonable for NWS to defend this litigation in Idaho. It is not unfair to subject
a person to the burdens of litigating in a forum where the person derives economic benefits from
the conduct at issue. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. Indeed, "it may well be unfair to allow [an
out-of-state defendant] to escape having to account in other States for consequences that arise
proximately from such [interstate] activities." Id.

Second, Idaho (the Plaintiff and the forum State in this action), has a strong interest in
adjudicating this dispute in Idaho. It is, after all, Idaho law that NWS is breaking. Denying
personal jurisdiction here defeats that interest and would preclude Idaho from seeking relief
provided for by the relevant laws.

Third, Idaho has a great interest, too, in furthering important substantive social policiesthe protection of the public health and the effective regulation of tobacco, a most dangerous
product. The Legislature has, as noted, emphasized that the Complementary Act's provisions
will "safeguard ... the fiscal soundness of the state and the public health." Idaho Code § 39840 I. And it cannot be gainsaid but that Idaho has an interest in the effective administration of
its tax laws too.
Where the Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of purposeful availment, the burden
shifts to the defendant to make a "compelling case" that jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. NWS has not done this. And it is hard to imagine such a
statement forthcoming, because if something were to be unfair in this case or that would offend
justice and fair play, it would be if Idaho could not hold NWS accountable for its sales of over
100 million cigarettes into Idaho, all of them contraband and illegal.
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VII.

NWS's
ARGUMENT AGAINST THE
JURISDICTION IS NOT PERSUASIVE

EXERCISE

OF

PERSONAL

NWS makes one general argument for why Idaho courts may not exercise personal
jurisdiction over it and it is that NWS's sales and shipments of cigarettes to Warpath are an
"insufficient contact with the State of Idaho for Plaintiffs to maintain this suit under traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Appellant's Brief: p. 33.

This assertion is

unsupportable for several reasons.
A.

Warpath's Location on a Reservation Does Not Defeat the Exercise of
Personal Jnrisdiction Over NWS

Warpath's location does not preclude an Idaho court from exercising personal jurisdiction
over NWS. First, even if the Court were to consider Warpath to be a "foreign entity," which it is
not-Warpath is an Idaho corporation and resident-the fact is that courts, including this one,
regularly find jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where the defendant's product arrived in the
forum via an equally foreign middleman. See, e.g., Duignan, 98 Idaho at 137-38, 559 P.2d at
753-54; Doggett, 93 Idaho at 27-29,454 P.2d at 64-66; Nat'/ Union Fire Insur.; 259 F. Supp. 2d

at 1102; A. Uberti &

c.

v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 906

(Italian manufacturer whose guns were sold in Arizona through third party middleman in
Massachusetts); Duple Motor Bodies Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969) (sale of
product by foreign manufacturer via middleman in England to buyers in Hawaii).
Second, being on an Indian reservation is not like being in a foreign country or even in a

sister state. It does not mean you are not part of the State where the reservation is located. "The
attributes of sovereignty possessed by [a1 Tribe do not negate the fact that [a1 Reservation is a
part of the State of California."

Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of

Equalization, 800 F.2d 1446, 1450 (9th Cir. 1986). If, for example, you are on a reservation in

Idaho you are in Idaho: "State sovereignty does not end at a reservation's border. ... Ordinarily,
33

it is now clear, an Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the State." Hicks, 533
U.S. at 361-62 (citations omitted); see also Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 188 ("[A]ll of Cotton's
leases are located entirely within the borders of the State of New Mexico and also within the
borders of the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. Indeed, they are also within the borders of the
United States. There are, therefore, three different governmental entities, each of which has
taxing jurisdiction over all of the non-Indian wells."). As such, there is nothing in United States
Supreme Court precedent to preclude the consideration of cigarettes flowing to a location on a
reservation within Idaho as contacts with that State.
Third, Warpath's ownership by Indians is of no relevance. As an Idaho-incorporated and

based business, it is an Idaho resident. This is true, even though it is owned by members of the
tribe on whose reservation it sits. It is hard then to understand how shipments of millions of
cigarettes to an Idaho resident in Idaho are not contacts to be considered by a court in
dete=ining personal jurisdiction.
Two recent cases reject NWS's "reservation location" argument as it relates to personal
jurisdiction. In Oklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply Company, 237 P.3d 199 (Okla. 2010),
NWS asserted that its sale of millions of cigarettes into Oklahoma were to tribal wholesalers
with the intent that they only be sold to reservation Indians. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
rejected this argument as a basis for defeating a finding of personal jurisdiction: "While the
entity with which [NWS] directly deals may operate on tribal land, that tribal land is not
located in some parallel universe. It is geographically within the State of Oklahoma." 237
P.3d at 208 (emphasis added)
In People v. Native Wholesale Supply, 126 Cal.RptrJd 257 (Cal. App. 2011), reviewing
very similar facts and the same arguments NWS raises here, the California Court of Appeals also
upheld a finding of personal jurisdiction. The Court approved of the Oklahoma decision (noting
34

that "'Oklahoma is OK' on this point"), 126 Cal.Rptr.3d at 264, and found personal jurisdiction
proper as a result of the court not seeing "just a stream of commerce, but a torrent." Id. at 260.23
B.

The Cases NWS Relies Upon Are Not Persuasive

NWS cites to two cases-Mahoney and North Pacific Insurance v. Switzier, 924 P.2d 839
(Or. Ct. App. 1996)-to support its position. Neither case advances NWS's personal jurisdiction
arguments.
Concerning Mahoney, NWS cites its statement that "sales occurnng within the
boundaries of an Indian reservation [are] not sales occurring within Idaho's domain," 96 Idaho at
62,524 P.2d at 190, as support for the conclusion that its sales to Warpath may not be considered
contacts for purposes of assessing personal jurisdiction. It should first be noted that Mahoney is
not a personal jurisdiction case. The statement cited was not in the context of determining

personal jurisdiction. Rather, the issue before the Mahoney Court was whether, under the Indian
Commerce Clause, Idaho could tax various on-reservation cigarettes sales.

The Court's

conclusions in the case are not helpful in analyzing personal jurisdiction here, especially given
that the Mahoney Court's holdings, as noted above, have been effectively overruled by
subsequent United States Supreme Court precedent. See, supra, p. 23-24.
It is true that in reaching its decision, the Mahoney Court cited to Article 21, § 19 of the

Idaho Constitution. This provision states, in part, that "Indian lands shall remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States." This provision does not,
however, defeat a finding of personal jurisdiction here.
First, just as one can find minimum contacts in a State for conduct occurring on land

owned by the federal government, such as a National Forest, there is nothing to preclude finding
personal jurisdiction here merely because the recipient is located on a reservation.
23

NWS was found to have sold and shipped into California over 300 million cigarettes. Id. at 263.
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Second, the present case is not one whit about asserting "control" over Indian lands. It is
about the introduction into Idaho of cigarettes unlawful to be sold and introduced thereto.
There is nothing in Article 21, § 19's provisions that prohibit this.

Third, in interpreting very similar language contained in various States' Enabling Acts,
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that such provisions do not, under federal law, serve
to bar a state from exercising jurisdiction over a matter otherwise subject to state court
jurisdiction.

See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 561-65 (1983); see

Montana v. Gilham, 133 F.3d 1133, 1139 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the disclaimer provision in an
enabling act has been construed as having no independent preemptive effect"). No reason exists
to construe Article 21, § 19, which corresponds to disclaimer provisions contained in the
enabling acts for most other western States admitted to the Union in the later nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, to cede greater regulatory authority than otherwise compelled by
federal law as definitively construed by the United States Supreme Court. San Carlos Apache
463 U.S. at 561 n. 12. 24
As regards to North Pacific, this was a case in which an insurance company brought a
declaratory judgment action that the driver of a truck involved in a single-car accident on the
Warm Springs Reservation was not covered by a policy issued by the insurance company. The
lower court ruled that the victims of the accident were necessary parties and joined them. The

24 Idaho's Admission Act, adopted by Congress in 1890, Pub. L. No. 105-296,26 Stat. 215 (1890), did
not contain in it the language regarding Indian Country that other State's Enabling Acts had in them. This
is because Idaho had already adopted the language in its State Constitution in 1889 with the identical
language already included therein. Knox v. State, 148 Idaho 324, 329, 223 P.3d 266, 271 (2009). A
review of the minutes from Idaho's Constitutional Convention indicates that the founders copied Article
21, § 19 from other States' enabling acts and inserted it in Idaho's Constitution to conform Idaho's
Constitution to that which they knew the Congress was requiring of other States. See 2 Proceedings and
Debates '<fthe Constitutional Convention of Idaho 1889, 1653-56, 1965-67 (1912). Thus, there is nothing
to suggest that the Idaho Constitutional Founders intended or understood Article 21, § 19 to be interpreted
any differently than how the United States Supreme Court interpreted this language in other States'
Enabling Acts in San Carlos.
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victims objected, arguing that as members and residents of the Warm Springs Tribes, the state
court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. The lower court disagreed. On appeal, the
insurance company contended that Rule 4 A(2) of Oregon's Rules of Civil, which grants
personal jurisdiction over "natural person[ s1 domiciled within this state," supported the lower
court's ruling. The Oregon Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that persons who reside on a
reservation are not "domiciled" in Oregon.
The short answer to North Pacific is that this intermediate state appellate case is at odds
with other cases, including the later-decided Hicks, discussed above. See, supra, p., 15 n. 11.
See also, Acosta v. San Diego County, 126 Cal.App.2d 455, 465 (Cal.App. 1954) ("Indians living
on reservations in California are citizens and residents of this state").

To pose the obvious

question: If tribal members residing on the Warm Springs Reservation are not domiciled in
Oregon, what state are they domiciled in?
C.

Conclusion-Idaho Courts May Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over NWS

In summary, NWS's location on the Seneca Reservation does not mean that a court in
Idaho may not exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Instead the very opposite is true: "Activity
of tribal members that takes place within e reservation but has an impact outside the reservation
may be regulated by the states." Maybee, 965 A.2d at 57-58.

Idaho-like all States-has

various regulatory jurisdiction over conduct on a reservation in many instances. Although its
regulatory jurisdiction over conduct that is solely between members of a given tribe on their
reservation may be limited, when non-members are involved (such as NWS), or when onreservation conduct has off-reservation effects, such as when 100 million cigarettes are flowing
tluough the reservation to non-members, state law can and does apply. See, e.g., New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983) ("A State's regulatory interest will be
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particularly substantial if the State can point to

ot1~reservation

effects that necessitate State

intervention").
Similarly, Warpath's location on a reservation does not defeat a court from exercising
personal jurisdiction over NWS. There is nothing in Indian law that supports a finding of no
personal jurisdiction merely because Warpath, a non-Indian, happens to be on a reservation. It is
still located and receiving the contraband cigarettes in Idaho.
In the end, over a prolonged period of time NWS sold and shipped tens of millions of
contraband cigarettes to a location in Idaho.

That is sufficient to uphold an Idaho court

exercising personal jurisdiction over it. 25
VIII. IDAHO REQUESTS AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
Idaho Code Section 39-8407(5) of the Complementary Act states that "[i]n any action
brought by the attorney general to enforce this chapter [the Complementary Act], the attorney
general shall be entitled to recover the costs of investigation, expert witness fees, costs of the
action and reasonable attorney's fees." This Court in Maybee clarified that an award of attorney
fees under this statute is only available should Idaho prevail. Maybee, 148 Idaho at 535, 224
P.3d at 1124. Thus, should this Court affirm the District Court, Idaho is entitled to and therefore
requests its reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.

IX.

NWS IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
NWS asks for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117 and 12-121. These

sections, of course, only allow for the award of attorney fees in instances where the party against
whom fees are sought has acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact (Section 12-117) or
25 NWS also argues that the District Court erred in granting an injunction against it and awarding Idaho
civil penalties. Appellant's Brief, pp. 40-42. NWS does not raise any substantive, independent
arguments concerning these issues. Rather, NWS' s arguments on these two issues rest upon its
"reservation-to-reservation" arguments that it has advanced concerning its claims related to subject matter
and personal jurisdiction.
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brought or maintained an action frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation (Section 12121). While Section 12-117 applies, in part, to state agencies, it does not apply to the State itself.
Idaho Code Section 12-117(1) and (4). Section 12-121, however, applies to all parties.
Regardless of each Section's applicability, the fact is that no award of attorney fees
should be assessed unless NWS prevails and there is a finding of impropriety on the part of the
State. That finding cannot be made here. Idaho prevailed below; it is defending the District
Court's rulings. Further, the arguments advanced by NWS have not been recognized before, and
the cases it relies upon are not sound, are misconstrued, or in one instance, has been effectively
overruled. Idaho has not acted unreasonably, frivolously, or without foundation. This is true
even if the Court were to reverse the District Court, which, of course, it should not, given the
clear law and undisputed facts of this case.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's entry of judgment should be affinned. This Court should award
Idaho its reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
Respectfnlly submitted this 31 st day of January 2012.

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Deputy Attorney General
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